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I. INTRODUCTION
The general view is that use of contingency fees in criminal cases
is an ethical violation.' Although most believe this to be true,
compelling justification has not been put forth to explain why such an
arrangement is per se unethical. Instead, proponents of the general
view simply state that such an arrangement is contrary to public
policy.2 This is where the idea begins, and also where it ends. Indeed,
the concept of contingent fees in criminal defense practice is a short-
lived road that is rarely traveled upon. If one should look for
persuasive guidance as to why this general view exists without having
a vast foundational basis to rest upon, one might find himself on an
empty journey without light at the end of the tunnel. With so many
issues and interests intertwined, and so many questions left
unanswered, one should still ask the basic question: "why?"
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and Technology. The author would like to thank the wonderful staff of the Seattle University
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1. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d)(2) (1983) (stating that a
lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee for representing
a defendant in a criminal case); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-
106(C) (1979); N.Y. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 697 (1997), available at
http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Attomey-Resources/Ethics- Opinions/Com
mitteeonProfessionalEthicsOpinion_697.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2004); Conn. Bar Ass'n,
How Lawyers are Paid, at http://www.ctbar.org/article/articleview/250 (last visited Feb. 28,
2004).
2. See Genins v. Geiger, 240 S.E.2d 745, 747 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that a
contingency fee arrangement in a criminal case that would be paid upon a favorable disposition
to the client is "void as against public policy"); see also Baca v. Padilla, 190 P. 730, 731 (N.M.
1920) (noting that contracts by attorneys for contingent fees are generally upheld by courts, but
contracts for a contingent fee by an attorney in a criminal case, dependent upon conviction, is
contrary to public policy).
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Perhaps the individual who embarked on this journey would not
gain any more than what he or she already knows by reading this
article. However, from an unbiased standpoint, this article attempts to
shed light on the use of a contingent fee arrangement in criminal
defense, and offers differing views pertaining to this topic. First, this
article will generally describe what a contingent fee is. Second, the
role and potential application of the contingent fee in both criminal
and civil settings will be discussed. Third, problems associated with
such an arrangement in criminal defense practice will be addressed, as
will certain positive aspects of such an arrangement. Finally, this
article will discuss how lawmakers could address this issue to ensure
that contingency arrangements cannot be abused.
II. THE CONTINGENT FEE
A contingent fee depends on the outcome of a future event-an
outcome the client seeks when an attorney is initially consulted.3
Through use of such a plan, an attorney will receive a pre-set
percentage of the total award obtained in the client's favor.4 However,
if the attorney is unsuccessful in his pursuit of the client's interest,
then the attorney may walk away empty-handed. In essence, the
attorney is gambling as he is taking a chance with his income
whenever he proceeds with a case.'
Since this means that no initial nor regular fee must be paid for
services rendered, clients with limits on their pocket books, or those
who feel their claim is one which can not achieve victory, may be
prompted to proceed with their claim anyway. This can have both
3. See Shanks v. Kilgore, 589 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (defining a
contingency fee as one "arrived at early in the employment of an attorney, with liability of the
client dependent upon the outcome of the anticipated litigation and stated as a percentage of the
sum awarded the client").
4. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 614 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a contingent fee as an"arrangement between attorney and client whereby attorney agrees to represent client with
compensation to be a percentage of the amount recovered"); see also DeGraff v. McKesson &
Robbins, Inc., 292 N.E.2d 310, 315 (N.Y. 1972), which describes how contingent fees can fall
into several categories:
The fee may be a straight percentage of the entire recovery, a percentage of the
recovery over some minimum, or may include an increment in addition to a low, fixed
retainer or time-based fee. The percentage, where there is a percentage, may be
adjusted depending on the range of the recovery, or different percentages may be
applied to successive increments of the same recovery. Also, a contingent fee may be a
fixed sum if the lawsuit is successful, or a schedule of fixed sums depending on the
range of the recovery. In each instance, the relative risks borne by the lawyer and his
client would be different, and the amount of the fee that would be reasonable in a
successful case would vary.
5. See F. B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 3 (1964) (stating
that if no recovery is obtained for the client, the lawyer is entitled to no fee at all).
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positive and negative impacts on the practice of law, 6 an issue that in
and of itself primarily pertains to the actual merit of the civil claim, a
topic that transcends the scope of discussing the role of contingency
fees in criminal cases. Nevertheless, as a consequence, clients with a
low likelihood of success on the merits frequently have their claims
litigated by attorneys employing a contingency fee plan.'
This may often be the scenario in civil cases, in which a client
can choose whether to proceed with a claim. In contrast, criminal
cases involve persons who are not litigating simply to further their
interests-they are litigating to preserve and protect their interests.8
Criminal defendants have no choice whether to litigate or not, for it is
the State that commences proceedings, and failure to comply with
authorities may result in steeper criminal sanctions for the defendant.'
Unlike civil cases, in which an attorney can screen out meritless claims
by refusing to accept a case, a criminal case is a situation in which the
defendant is guaranteed to have an attorney. 10
6. Positive aspects may include meritorious claims, initially believed to lack merit, can now
be heard, and potentially expensive legal services can now be available to a larger portion of the
general population with little or no risk to clients. However, a drawback of this very scenario
may develop, as expanding the numbers of potential clients provided with these opportunities
may open the door to an increasing number of frivolous lawsuits. In re Sosa, 980 S.W.2d 814
(Tex. Ct. App. 1998) provides an illustration of a claim that was filed by an indigent because the
client would not have to pay for costs if the client were to lose. The indigent client did not care
whether the claim contained merit or not. Although the court did not address whether the claim
was frivolous or not, the court stated that "[i]t is the glory of the contingency system that a client,
indigent or otherwise, with a meritorious claim, can be fully equal to the largest defendant." Id.
at 818 (Hardberger, J., concurring).
7. See, e.g., Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 622 So. 2d 570, 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) (illustrating an example of a claim for attorney fees when a contingency plan was
utilized in a prior case that had a very low likelihood of success on the merits).
8. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 (1994) (noting, in a civil rights action, that an
individual has a Fourth Amendment "Liberty Interest" to be free from the prosecution of any
alleged criminal acts unless the circumstances indicate probable cause that the defendant
committed the act because of "the deprivations of liberty that go hand in hand with criminal
prosecutions").
9. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318-19 (1976) (distinguishing criminal cases
from civil cases by claiming that the stakes are higher in criminal cases because one's liberty or
even life is at stake, and a defendant is up against the state, whose "sole interest is to convict").
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, applying to defendants in federal criminal trials, and made
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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III. THE CONTINGENT FEE AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE
ATTORNEY
It has been pointed out that in a criminal case, it is hard for an
attorney to effectively screen out potential clients." A majority of
criminal defendants are indigent 12 - those who would ordinarily not
have their cases taken by an attorney if in a civil trial. 3 This could
mean that in criminal cases, those accused who are most likely to favor
a contingency fee plan could be those with whom the attorney would
least want to be making such a bargain. 4 Further, it may be harder
for an attorney to conduct such a screening process because a criminal
defendant may lack important attributes that help an attorney
distinguish an individual with a high likelihood of conviction from
11. See Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 595,
613-15 (1993) (distinguishing clients with weak claims from those with strong claims and
explaining that an attorney will assume a contingent fee relationship with a client when the
expected return is greater or equal to the amount expected to be obtained based on the likelihood
of success and the percentage agreed upon).
12. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDIGENT DEFENSE at 1 (Feb. 1996), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/id.txt (last visited Mar. 5, 2004) (noting that"three-fourths of the inmates in State prisons and about half of those in Federal prisons received
publicly -provided legal counsel for the offense for which they were serving time" and "in 1992
about 80% of defendants charged with felonies in the Nation's seventy-five largest counties relied
on a public defender or on assigned counsel for legal representation"). It should be noted that
criminal defense attorneys engaged in providing representation as assigned counsel to indigent
defendants face financial troubles as a direct result of their representation, due to low in and out
of court hourly fees paid by the state for indigent representation. See People v. Thompson, No.
3717-00, 2003 WL 145536, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9, 2003); see also People v. Branch, No.
2037/2000, 2001 WL 881109 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 12, 2001).
The profound inadequacy of compensation has markedly reduced the number of
attorneys choosing to accept assignments to represent indigent defendants. And
among those now unwilling to do so are many experienced and highly-skilled defense
attorneys. In many instances, the smaller pool of available and competent lawyers has
resulted in delays in moving cases to trial or disposition, and has given rise to the risk
that the legal assistance provided to indigent defendants will be less than
effective .... For those defendants who are innocent, this means longer waits to be
free of unfounded criminal accusations, and raises the specter of wrongful conviction.
For those defendants who are guilty, it means welcome delays, with an increased
likelihood that witnesses will become lost and memories will fade.
See Branch, 2001 WL 881109 (citation omitted). Attempts by attorneys to work around already
determined fees for criminal defense representation or to become privately retained by
individuals an attorney has been appointed to represent may lead to sanctions and suspension.
See, e.g., In re Singer, 752 N.Y.S.2d 655, 656 (App. Div. 2002), (per curium).
13. See, e.g., James R. Neuhard, The Right to Counsel: Shouldering the Burden, 2 T.M.
COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 169, 173-75 (1998) (noting that although there is a duty to
fulfill pro-bono work, the reality is that a vast majority of attorneys will not handle cases
involving indigent clients).
14. See Karlan, supra note 11, at 596 (describing this scenario as the "problem of adverse
selection," based on the incentive criminal defendants with high probabilities of convictions will
have to retain a lawyer who charges a contingent fee).
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another with a lower likelihood.'" In fact, because of the general type
of clientele that the average criminal defense attorney attracts, it may
be acknowledged that a good criminal defense attorney makes sure
that the client makes payment prior to the entry of a plea. This line of
thinking illustrates the possibility that any fee arrangement in the
criminal context may ultimately turn out to be a contingent one. As
such, intentionally representing a criminal client under a contingency
fee arrangement may not be too far of a stretch from what occurs in
criminal defense practice every day.
So why would a criminal defense attorney want to take part in
such a fee plan? Such a plan is enticing to a civil lawyer because he or
she will get a hefty percentage of the pie if successful. Most civil trials
are those in which a person's interest in property is at stake against an
adversary, 6 whereas in a criminal trial, it is a person's liberty that is at
stake against the government's interest in prosecuting the defendant.' 7
As such, the amount of personal monetary gain that can result from a
civil trial is not comparable to the gain that can result from a criminal
trial. Because of the discrepancy between criminal and civil cases
concerning the prospect of obtaining substantial financial gain, the
criminal defense attorney will not receive as great a payoff as a civil
attorney.
Notwithstanding this reality in criminal cases, there are usually
two issues associated with a criminal defense contingency fee plan.
One is that it may be a Constitutional violation.' 8 The other is that it
15. Id.
16. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 1.1 (2d ed. 1993) (noting the function of the adversary system in the American
judicial system).
17. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 1.3(a) (2d ed.
1986) (describing the societal interest in preventing crimes and imposing punishment on
wrongdoers who commit crimes).
18. The point of this article is to illustrate the ethical aspect of the use of contingency fees
in criminal cases, but not to provide an in-depth look at why such a plan may constitute a Due
Process violation. Any relation between a contingency fee plan in a criminal case and the Due
Process clause stems from the view that such a fee arrangement can turn both counsel and client
into joint venturers, with the attorney obtaining a direct stake in not only the case, but also the
client's future. See Karlan, supra note 11, at 605 n.46. The relationship that the criminal
defendant forms with the attorney in this situation may create a conflict of interest that can
impede the attorney's ability and duty to provide effective counsel, as proscribed by the Sixth
Amendment. However, court decisions indicate that the relationship formed between counsel
and client based upon a contingent pay plan does not conclusively render the service counsel
provided any less competent than it would have been had no relationship been present, nor does
it give rise to a conflict of interest grave enough to rise to the level of what is considered as
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 633
(1989) (stating that a contingent fee in a criminal case is not to be viewed as "ineffective
assistance per se" and is not an infringement of a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights).
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may be an ethical violation.19 Nevertheless, the most common
justification for declaring such a fee plan as improper in criminal cases
is that it is contrary to public policy. 2° This premise rests upon the
fact that there is no object of property produced from the litigation
that can serve as a basis from which to formulate the amount due to anattorney. 21 To obtain or produce property is the primary goal of the
civil plaintiff, and the lawyer is retained to achieve this goal. In a
criminal proceeding in which the defendant may face a prison
sentence, the primary goal of the defendant is to obtain freedom.22
But, regardless of whether the proceeding is civil or criminal, the
attorney vigilantly pursues the client's goals and, if victorious, both
civil and criminal parties have reached their intended goals with the
help of their lawyers. Notwithstanding, even if the goals of the client
are successfully reached, the book on the potential problems associated
with contingent fee arrangements is not closed.
IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH CONTINGENCY FEE PLANS
BEING UTILIZED BY CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
There are certain problems that may arise as a result of the use of
a contingency fee plan.23 For instance, the actions a lawyer undertakes
to meet the needs of their criminal defendant clients and to earn their
contingent fees may lead to ethical violations.24 Because the lawyer's
paycheck is dependent on the outcome of the case, there is a greater
incentive to win, thus prompting an attorney to take part in corrupt
practices that can improve the chances of success. 25  Of course, such
incentive exists regardless of whether the forum is civil or criminal,
19. See id. at 633 n.10 (noting that contingency fees in criminal cases are generally
unethical).
20. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 (1979) (stating that public
policy properly condemns contingent fee arrangements in criminal cases, largely on the grounds
that legal services in criminal cases do not produce a res with which to pay the fee); but see N.Y.
County. Lawyers' Ass'n Comm. on Prof l Ethics, Op. 714 (1996) (recognizing that contingent
fees are allowed in certain civil cases that do not produce a res, such as civil rights cases, which
have a substantial public interest comparable to criminal adjudication).
21. This may not always be the case. In certain circumstances, the acquittal of a defendant
may result in the defendant receiving an interest in property, such as in the form of a life
insurance policy. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 349 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
22. See JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRIMINAL
LAWYER § 7:7 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that "the stakes are higher and there is a weightier interest
in seeking justice in the outcome").
23. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-373 (1993)
(stating that contingent fee arrangements in criminal cases are prohibited "because such
arrangements may present the risk of giving the lawyer an interest that is in conflict either with
the client's interests or with important public interests").
24. See Karlan, supra note 11, at 610.
25. See id.
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but this piece strives to only address the role of the contingent fee in
criminal practice. Although such a potentially corruptive situation
may seem relevant only on the television drama, "The Practice," in
which the lead star is regularly faced with a conflict between criminal
defense and legal ethics, it should be apparent that such a situation
could take place in real life.
Consider this hypothetical: A defense attorney proffers evidence
tending to benefit the defendant. This evidence is not actually known
to the lawyer to be false, but does not seem believable to the
reasonable person. The defense attorney might not be so eager to
present such incredible evidence if he knew that he would be paid
regardless of the outcome in the case. The attorney's motive to
present such evidence is much stronger when the facts indicate that
the defendant will most likely be convicted. Using incredible evidence
in this type of situation would prejudice the plaintiff in the civil trial,
but would have a much more devastating effect in a criminal trial
because there are more persons harmed by such an act: the People of
the state represented by the prosecutor.
Although unethical techniques may be used by attorneys in civil
cases, 26 a civil case differs from a criminal case in several important
respects. In a civil case, the community in its entirety does not have as
great an interest in the case as compared to a criminal case where the
government has filed criminal charges against a defendant who has
committed a serious harm to society.27 The community's interest is
greater in the criminal context because the same defendant, or another,
might commit the crime again in the same locality if preventive steps
are not taken. 28 The public's interest in a civil case cannot be as great
because typically it is solely the wronged individual initiating the suit.
26. See Walter Olsen, Sue City: The Case Against the Contingency Fee, 55 POLICY REV. 46,
47 (1991) (stating that "[I]awyers as a profession face unusual temptations to engage in unethical
conduct").
27. See Lee Goldman, Toward a Colorblind Jury Selection Process: Applying the "Batson
Function" to Peremptory Challenges in Civil Trials, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 147, 185 (1990)
(distinguishing a civil trial from a criminal trial, because "[t]he public does not want to favor one
civil litigant over another").
28. This theory was reinforced in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987), in
which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. In this
case, the petitioner challenged his detention before trial. The Court, expressing the interest that
a government has in protecting the public, stated,
[w]hile the Government's general interest in preventing crime is compelling, even this
interest is heightened when the Government musters convincing proof that the
arrestee, already indicted or held to answer for a serious crime, presents a
demonstrable danger to the community. Under these narrow circumstances, society's
interest in crime prevention is at its greatest.
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In a criminal case, the community as a whole can benefit from the
punishment of the defendant. 29
Such unethical practices do not only include attempts to use
unethical techniques in front of a judge or jury. Unethical practices
can also occur in other contexts. For example, a client's liberty
interest may suffer if an attorney chooses to obtain or to plead to a
lesser charge, even though there is a good chance that the defendant
could have been acquitted.30 Stated otherwise, there could be a greater
incentive for the criminal lawyer to take a plea even when he knows
that he could prevail at trial.3 The reality is that most criminal cases
plea out, but a contingent fee arrangement could "encourage" guilty
pleas in inappropriate situations. The concern is that the attorney
may place his or her financial interest in the case before the interest of
the client. After all, a result is guaranteed when arising out of a
negotiated bargain between defendant, attorney, judge and prosecutor.
Otherwise, an attorney would take a chance with a jury, and risk not
being paid if he or she is unsuccessful. Alternatively, an attorney may
place his or her client's future on the line by foregoing the opportunity
to seek a lesser charge in order to obtain a greater fee, even when there
is a slim chance that the defendant will prevail at trial.32 These
scenarios are bound to lead to constitutional violations that can harm
the accused, as the right to acquire zealous representation can be
vitiated when an attorney agrees to or overlooks a plea arrangement
without conducting a diligent investigation of the client's realistic
alternatives or the actual merits of the case.33
Courts approach criminal cases in which a contingency fee plan
has been utilized in different ways. The presence of a conflict of
29. See Goldman, supra note 27, at 185.
30. See Peter Lushing, The Fall and Rise of the Criminal Contingent Fee, 82 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 498, 517 (1991) (noting that this circumstance is a conflict of interest since an
attorney can earn a bigger fee through an acquittal).
31. This scenario may not only be an ethical violation, but may also be a constitutional
violation, since the defense attorney is most likely not performing his function by serving as
effective advocate, and is not furthering his client's interest, or "putting the constitution to the
test." Nevertheless, the constitutional remedy of granting a new trial for this type of behavior
does not seem to be an effective measure to deter the misuse of and improper conduct associated
with contingency fees in the criminal justice system. See id. at 521.
32. See Schoonover v. Kansas, 543 P.2d 881 (Kan. 1975) (illustrating a situation in which a
criminal defendant entered into a contingency fee arrangement with her attorney and upon
conviction, appealed on the grounds that counsel was ineffective because the attorney had not
sought a plea bargain that may have been beneficial to the client's interests when the attorney
had the opportunity to do so).
33. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-4.1(a) (3d ed. 1993) (stating that one duty of a defense
attorney is to fully investigate a case even if a plea agreement is contemplated).
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interest was the key issue in New Hampshire v. Labonville,34 in which a
criminal defendant contested the legal representation she received at
her trial. The defendant in the case was convicted of conspiracy to
murder her husband and retained the services of an attorney she had
used in previous civil matters also related to the death of her
husband.3" The contingency fee agreement worked like this: if the
defendant was acquitted the defense attorney would receive eighty-
five dollars per hour for out of court time, and one hundred dollars per
hour for in court time.36 In addition, if acquitted, the defendant would
receive $153,000 from the life insurance policies of her late husband.37
If convicted, however, the attorney would only bill the state twenty
dollars per hour for out of court time, and thirty dollars per hour for in
court time.38  Because the defendant was convicted in the case, the
attorney received $1,500 from the state for his services, and $900 for
his expenses.39
The defendant contended that because of this pay arrangement,
the representation she received was ineffective.4" Although the court
did not look favorably upon the rate plan that the attorney had
utilized, it did not automatically view utilization of a contingency fee
as constituting ineffective assistance of counsel.41 Instead, the court
analyzed whether there had been a constitutional violation and did not
34. 492 A.2d 1376 (N.H. 1985).
35. Id. at 1377-78.
36. Id. at 1378.
37. Id. In reference to an arrangement such as this, it should be noted that a court or
ethical committee might examine ways to justify payment of a criminal defense attorney on a
contingency basis without labeling the arrangement a contingent one. For instance, the
Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics for the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York was faced with the following scenario: An attorney was hired to represent a client in a civil
claim using a "standard contingency fee arrangement." Subsequent to the agreement, the client
was arrested and indicted on criminal charges. The client utilized the same attorney's services
under the same arrangement for representation on the criminal matter. The Committee on
Professional and Judicial Ethics did not find that the representation relating to the criminal
matter was an ethical violation, and did not view the arrangement as a contingent fee plan in a
criminal action. Instead, the Committee found that the criminal defense fee was "not contingent
upon the successful accomplishment of any event in that action. Rather, it would be contingent
upon the client's successful recovery of a verdict in the civil negligence action. Moreover, the
potential recovery in the negligence action provides a fund from which the fixed fee in the
criminal action can be paid." Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof 1 and Judicial
Ethics, Formal Op. 1986-3 (Apr. 30, 1986), available at http://www.abcny.org (last visited
Mar. 3, 2004).
38. Labonville, 492 A.2d at 1378.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1379. Although the appellant claimed violations of both the New Hampshire
Constitution and the Federal Constitution, the court only based its decision on the state
constitution. However, the standard for determining whether a contingent fee agreement is a
constitutional violation is the same as used in the federal system.
20041
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utilize any relevant ethical standards in reaching its conclusion. In
doing so, the court held that "a defendant must establish that an actual
conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance" in
order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 42
Because of the vast discrepancy in hourly fees in this case, there
appeared to be a real incentive for the attorney to resort to corrupt
practices in order to obtain the most desirable fee. Additionally, a
reasonable person could view the circumstances, which revolved
around the attainment of insurance proceeds, as inherently suspicious.
But the court held that the attorney's performance did not adversely
affect the defendant, and that no conflict of interest existed.43
The Labonville case appears to stand for the proposition that
there may be a place in the criminal justice system for contingent fee
arrangements. If the court were to come out and state that the
contingent fee lacks a role in the criminal justice system, this premise
would lack merit. However, the Labonville court did not construct its
opinion to relay a clear message on this issue. Notwithstanding the
court's message that such a plan may pose an ethical issue, the court
did not regard the arrangement as an automatic ground for
complaining about one's counsel. In doing so, it has placed the
burden on the defendant to establish that the contingency fee plan
actually had an "adverse effect" on the outcome. With all
practicalities considered, it seems as if this is a substantial burden for
the defendant to overcome in most instances because the attorney can
always negate prejudice by claiming that the defendant would have
been convicted anyway. Perhaps the amount of deference that has
been granted to the attorney unfairly detracts from a defendant's
potential remedy against their attorney in a subsequent case. It also,
perhaps, demonstrates the principle that lawyers will strive to protect
their own collective interests before those of others. This advantage
can be harmful to a criminal defendant who, after conviction, seeks a
remedy against their attorney. In practice, an obstacle that the
defendant now faces-possible presumption that the assistance
rendered by counsel was effective-can in effect preclude the
defendant from obtaining the degree of justice that he or she may
deserve.
But there is another aspect to such a contingency fee arrangement
in this situation that should not be overlooked. In Labonville, the
attorney was to be paid a certain amount pending acquittal, but he was
also to be paid (albeit at a much lower rate) by the state even if he lost
42. Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980)).
43. Id. at 1380.
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the case. Given this reality, it seems as if the lawyer was the one
without the contingency, since he was in a no-lose situation. Under
this analysis, the client is the one with their future up in the air, but
the lawyer gets paid either way. Of course, an incentive for the
attorney to win and obtain a bigger fee still exists, but this incentive is
not as great since he will not walk away empty handed for his services,
and he will be paid for his out of pocket expenses. Yet, in a
subsequent case to establish that the attorney did not properly do his
job, it is the client who must overcome the burden. This makes it
seem as if the client is the one being punished when it is the attorney
who has arguably committed an ethical violation. Thus, an attorney
who participates in such a plan may have little to fear from the
exploitation of others.
Another case recognized that a contingency fee plan used in this
context may create a conflict of interest. In People v. Winkler," the
New York Court of Appeals applied a similar standard to place the
burden on the accused, and the court rejected the notion that such a
plan automatically constituted per se ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court first viewed the arrangement as "unquestionably
unethical,"4 yet failed to articulate precisely why such a fee
arrangement should be considered this way, besides resting on
grounds of public policy.46
In Winkler, the defendant was accused of murdering his father,
and the lawyer he retained agreed to represent him for a set fee, plus
an additional $25,000, contingent on the defendant being found not
guilty (either on the merits, by reason of insanity, or through "some
other legal reason").47 This contingent $25,000 was to be taken from
the inheritance the defendant was to receive from his father's estate.4"
The attorney in this case also represented the settlement of the
victim's estate.49 Notwithstanding the court's examination of the
conflict of interest present, and its recognition that there may be an
incentive to employ corrupt tactics in order to obtain a greater fee, the
44. 523 N.E.2d 485 (N.Y. 1988), on remand, 533 N.Y.S.2d 913 (App. Div. 1988), rev'd,
541 N.E.2d 409, 410 (N.Y. 1989), on remand, 554 N.Y.S.2d 494 (App. Div. 1989), affd, 578
N.Y.S.2d 582 (App. Div. 1992), appeal denied, 600 N.E.2d 651 (N.Y. 1992), habeas corpus
denied, 812 F.Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304 (2d Cir. 1993),
and cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1022 (1994).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 486-87.
47. Id. at 486.
48. Id. It should be noted that the arrangement originally called for a $15,000 fee.
However, it was Winkler himself who crossed out $15,000 and wrote in $25,000 prior to agreeing
to the arrangement.
49. Id. at 486.
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court held that it was the defendant who had the burden of proving
that the contingent fee arrangement was the root of ineffective
assistance of counsel, and remanded the case for a fact finding hearing
consistent with its opinion."0 Winkler then took his shot in federal
court, and petitioned for per se reversal. The Second Circuit noted
with authority that "[w]ithout doubt, trial counsel's acceptance of the
contingency fee agreement for representing a criminal defendant is
highly unethical and deserves the strongest condemnation." 51  In
addition, the Second Circuit found that the fee arrangement between
Winkler and his attorney gave rise to an actual conflict of interest.5 2
However, the Second Circuit, like the New York Court of Appeals,
found that per se reversal for such a conflict of interest was not
appropriate.53 The Winkler Court noted that per se reversal should be
limited to two specific circumstances-practice by an unlicensed
attorney and practice by an attorney in which the attorney himself
engages in the defendant's crimes. 4 As the use of a contingency fee
plan fit neither of these two scenarios, the Second Circuit declined to
reverse Winkler's conviction.55
Labonville and Winkler provide examples of how courts will
continuously frown upon the use of contingency fees in criminal cases,
but will be reluctant to promulgate rules to deter it.56 These cases also
demonstrate that although a court will declare such a practice to be
unethical, other grounds, such as constitutional or statutory
provisions, will be used to justify a court's decision.57 Despite the
substantial social policy interest in the way criminal cases are
administered, this interest, by itself, is not enough for a court to
automatically view a contingent fee arrangement as impermissible.
If obtaining a fee contingent upon achieving a specific result in a
criminal case is unanimously deemed improper," it appears
unexplainable why courts do not take steps to remedy this wrong
50. Id. at 487-88.
51. Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1993).
52. Id. at 307-08.
53. Id. at 308.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 310.
56. In all respect, it should be noted that these two cases involved defendants who retained
attorneys that they had also employed in other actions--civil actions concerning the proceeds
from insurance policies taken out on the victim's lives. Perhaps the results would be different if
the attorneys and clients had no previous relation before the criminal trial arose. But it should
also be noted that one who retains an attorney by way of a contingent fee plan with money to be
paid out of an insurance policy pending acquittal seems controversial in and of itself.
57. See also Fogarty v. State, 513 S.E.2d 493, 498 (Ga. 1999) (Sears, J., concurring).
58. See Winkler, 523 N.E.2d at 485.
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when it is discovered. 9 Perhaps ostensible judicial inaction appears as
courts prefer to ensure that certain thresholds are satisfied before vast
amounts of criminal cases become reversed on appeal and new trials
must be ordered.6" Although there is a plausible need to maintain
standards within the criminal justice system, there is no excuse for a
deficiency in articulating the reasons why contingency fees are not
appropriate in criminal cases.
V. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF USING A CONTINGENT FEE PLAN IN
CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE
There appears to be no reason to distinguish a lawyer who
predominantly practices criminal law from another who practices civil
law.6 Both are equally qualified and should possess the same skills
needed to practice law.62 However, it seems as if the criminal lawyer
59. See, e.g, Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 308-10 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that there had
been no ineffective assistance of counsel rendered by the defense attorney in the New York
Winkler cases, supra, and rejecting a per se reversal rule whenever a criminal defense attorney
enters into a contingent fee agreement with a defendant); but see Illinois v. Meyers, 263 N.E.2d
81, 82-83 (I1. 1970) (reversing a defendant's conviction when the defendant pled guilty as part
of a deal with the state. The attorney did not seek the initial recommendation that the state
offered, which was half the sentence he was to receive. The court primarily focused on the
conflict of interest the defense attorney had, and reversed the conviction because the attorney did
not understand his duties to the client due to this conflict.).
60. Perhaps appellate courts are reluctant to automatically overturn convictions and allow
criminal defendants to go free merely because a contingency pay plan was used. A contingent
pay plan may lead to a conflict of interest for defense counsel, but this does not mean that
ineffective assistance was rendered. The Supreme Court has set forth a standard to measure
ineffective assistance in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as well as a standard by
which to measure whether any conflict of interest should lead to reversal in Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335 (1980). Under Strickland, a defendant must show that their defense attorney's
performance fell below "an objective standard of reasonableness" and that this inadequate
representation prejudiced the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 691-93. The
Strickland Court stated that a "presumption of prejudice" is proper when a defendant can show
that he or she has (actively or constructively) been denied the assistance of legal representation.
Id. at 692. In comparison, a defendant attempting to show a conflict of interest by his or her
attorney must demonstrate that there has been an actual conflict. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350. Thus,
Strickland allows for a constructive showing of prejudice while Cuyler requires an actual showing,
and the presumption Strickland allows provides a criminal defendant with an easier burden to
meet in showing that their case has been prejudiced. Since there is a lower applicable standard for
ineffective assistance claims, there may be a tendency for defendants on appeal to convert their
conflict of interest claims into ineffective assistance claims. The courts may recognize this, and
as such, be reluctant to reverse all general claims of attorney prejudice made by convicted
criminal defendants.
61. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 9.4.3 (1986) (remarking that
the criminal justice system "is probably no more susceptible to corruption by defense lawyers
made overzealous by contingent fees than is the civil system," which is comprised of
predominantly the same lawyers).
62. Id.
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may be held back from having the same monetary possibilities as his
or her similarly situated colleagues practicing civil law because those
practicing criminal law have chosen an aspect of the profession in
which they have an avid interest. No evidence, statistical or otherwise,
tends to show that use of a contingency fee in a criminal case has any
actual effect on representation. Thus, there seems to be little reason
why a criminal lawyer should not have the same pecuniary
opportunities as his or her personal injury or antitrust counterparts.
The positive opportunities a contingent fee plan may provide for
may not only be for attorneys but perhaps for defendants as well.63
There exists a distinguishable variety of potential criminal
defendants.64  For instance, as one author has pointed out,
sophisticated white-collar defendants who can shop around for counsel
are quite differently situated from naive arrestees who must select an
attorney while incarcerated.65  Although the Sixth Amendment
guarantees criminal defendants the right to legal representation, 66 the
Supreme Court has stated that a criminal defendant has no Sixth
Amendment right to freely employ the c6unsel of their choice.67 Also,
the Court has stated that a defendant cannot insist on retaining the
services of an attorney they cannot afford. 61 With this reasoning, it
would seem that without contingency fee plans, only affluent
defendants would be able to freely retain their own private counsel.69
However, with a contingency fee plan, those with limited financial
means would have an opportunity to retain the counsel whom they
believe is the most competent to handle their case. This opportunity
may not have been possible without the use of a contingent fee plan.
Nevertheless, regardless of whether a contingent fee plan is used,
defendants viewed by attorneys as having a high risk of conviction still
have a safety net to fall back on-the constitutional right to have a
publicly appointed attorney.7"
63. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-373 (1993)
(noting that contingent fees may be appropriate in defense cases, as long as the client gives their
consent to the plan, and such plan is reasonable).
64. See Karlan, supra note 11, at 608.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963).
67. See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 624 (1989) (involving a defendant who claimed that
a criminal forfeiture statute served as a contingency fee plan because the property acquired
through the crimes he was charged with had to be forfeited pending conviction and what were
excluded from the assets taken were attorney fees he was to pay the firm he had retained).
68. See id.
69. Id. at 651 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-45.
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Not only could such a plan have positive aspects for an indigent
client, but it could also aid the profession as a whole. Since an
attorney may not receive as great of an amount of compensation from
criminal defense work as he or she would from the average civil case,
even the best intentioned attorneys may have little choice other than to
decline representing criminal defendants in many cases." Over time,
this means that talented attorneys will not practice criminal law, which
could "devastate the criminal defense bar."" In fact, use of
contingency fee plans can open new doors to attorneys who possess
interests in criminal law and trial litigation, as well as to those who
seek more court experience than they may find in civil practice.
Attorneys who would employ such a pay plan would be less reluctant
to take on criminal cases, thus providing more opportunities for
talented attorneys, which the world of criminal law could benefit from.
Providing talented attorneys with adequate and innovative financial
incentives to take on criminal cases could alleviate potential problems
stemming from a lack of resources in the current system.
VI. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND ISSUES CONCERNING
CONTINGENT FEE PLANS IN CRIMINAL CASES
Although there are undoubtedly positive factors linked to a
contingency fee plan, certain numerical concerns arise. Basically, the
question comes down to this: "how can we measure the
contingency?"73 Counsel has a duty to provide their client with a way
to assess how the fee should be handled; what type of fee is preferable;
and what is reasonable under the circumstances.74 In fact, a lawyer
must clearly indicate the exact percentage of the contingency fee
71. See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 646-647 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1316 (Md. 1986) and United States v. Rogers, 602
F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (Colo. 1985), and remarking that notwithstanding the legal profession's pro
bono commitment, this scenario is bound to happen. Caplin & Drysdale also point out that the
criminal justice system does have room for, and may even benefit from an influx of risk-taking
attorneys, who utilize legal strategies which may be quite effective, yet not condoned by the
world of the traditional publicly appointed criminal defense attorneys (i.e., the public defenders).
This is especially true when "specialized defense counsel" are needed for highly technical and
complex cases, in which there is the possibility that those attorneys who are publicly appointed
may not have an adequate opportunity or the resources to deal with the special circumstances
accompanying a complex trial).
72. Id. at 647.
73. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-373 (1993)
(noting that one problem with a contingency fee plan in a criminal case is the difficulty of
defining a successful outcome).
74. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (1983) (stating that "the basis or
rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client").
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charged once the lawyer and client agree to such a plan. At first, one
might suggest that the market price of the legal services rendered is an
effective measuring tool. 76 The question of how much an acquittal is
worth may be economical, 77 with attorneys charging fees according to
how intensely their clients need or want their legal services.78 An
acquittal in a murder case is different from one in a petit larceny
case, 79 and as such, one who has killed another is more likely to desire
an acquittal than one who has stolen an item of little value. Thus, the
category of the crime should also be examined when measuring the
value of the services.
When determining an appropriate amount to charge, an attorney
must also heavily weigh other pertinent factors. A lawyer should be
prompted to charge a higher percentage to an individual who has a
lower risk of evading conviction than a person who has a better chance
of getting off.8" For example, a criminal defendant may be highly
interested in maintaining his or her liberty interests.8' As such, he or
she may be willing to pay any amount the lawyer requests, possibly
creating an invitation to exploit the vulnerability of an indigent client
possessing little experience pertaining to criminal charges.82 This
75. DeGraff, 292 N.E.2d at 311 (stating, "[w]hen a lawyer informs a prospective client, at
the time he is retained, that his fee will be on a contingent basis, he should clearly indicate the
percentage of recovery to be received").
76. See Stephen D. Annand & Roberta F. Green, Legislative and Judicial Controls of
Contingency Fees in Tort Cases, 99 W. VA L. REV. 81, 83 (1996) (stating that the prevailing view
is that it is the market force that controls the amount of the contingency fee charged by a defense
counsel).
77. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal
Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 271 (1998) (describing what an "effective hourly rate" (EHR)
is. An "EHR" is the fee received by the lawyer divided by the amount of time the lawyer had to
expend to obtain that fee. "This measure captures the various elements of the contingencies
facing the lawyer. The numerator, the fee received, is a function of both the amount of damages
and whether the lawyer obtains any recovery for the client. The denominator is the amount of
time the case actually took.").
78. See MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 52 (describing the role of the contingency fee in
criminal cases and how highly the criminal defendant values the services of defense counsel
before the trial, when the criminal defendant has their greatest interest in the case).
79. An examination of the elements needed for each of these crimes is not conclusive of the
differences. Also what must be considered is the moral condemnation and stigmatization that is
associated with a crime such as murder. See, e.g., Leon Pearl, A Case Against the Kantian
Retributivist Theory of Punishment: A Response to Professor Pugsley, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273,
288 n.85 (1982).
80. See Karlan, supra note 11, at 623.
81. See W. Crews Lott, Balancing Burdens of Proof and Relevant Conduct: At What Point is
Due Process Violated, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 877, 888-89 (1993) (discussing the liberty interests a
defendant has through the different stages of the criminal justice process, and how important it is
at trial and sentencing).
82. See Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a
Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 669 (1995) (recognizing that lawyers who
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indigent client is an individual who desperately seeks legal help as the
government diligently investigates their background, and anything
else related to the criminal incident. At this point, a lawyer has the
opportunity to charge their client a fee that is excessive, which is by
itself an ethical violation. 4 An experienced defense attorney can take
advantage of the steep disparity in knowledge possessed by counsel
and client and rip off the unsophisticated criminal defendant who has
no idea of what an appropriate contingent fee should be in a criminal
case.8 5
A. Setting the proper amount for the contingency fee plan.
In a civil case, the contingency amount is set at a specific
percentage of the winnings.8 6 Hence, what the lawyer will receive as
compensation is an ascertainable amount."s In a criminal case, because
no res is produced,8 there is no way to establish a specific
ascertainable amount. A criminal defendant may be in the same
financial position post-outcome as they were prior to the
commencement of prosecution, regardless of the disposition. 9 For
instance, an attorney cannot charge a thirty-percent fee for an
bill on a contingency have an incentive to exploit whatever market power they have to
overcharge).
83. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing
Protection After United States v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1113-15 (1997)
(highlighting several incidents of criminal behavior and the actions the government undertook in
an effort to fully investigate the defendants to obtain convictions in each case).
84. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(A) (1979) (stating that "[a]
lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee").
85. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent-Fee Lawyers and Their Clients: Settlement
Expectations, Settlement Realities, and Issues of Control in the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 23 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 795, 811-12 (1998) (stating, in relation to the usual civil case, "the lawyer has
the kinds of experience and knowledge necessary to [evaluate whether the case is promising after
assessing information, valuing the case, and estimating likely costs and outcomes if the case goes
to trial], while only the very occasional client can begin to make the necessary judgments"); see
also Karlan, supra note 11, at 627 (noting the disparity in the level of knowledge defense counsel
has over her client).
86. See LESTER BRICKMAN, MICHAEL HOROWITZ, AND JEFFREY O'CONNELL,
RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES 13 (1994) (describing the premium charged when the
attorney's fee is contingent upon winning, and illustrating several examples of what percentage a
contingency fee may be, and whether it may be from the total amount of what the client recovers,
or from the amount that is left after all expenditures are paid off).
87. Id.
88. See People v. Winkler, 515 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (App. Div. 1987). See supra note 44 for
Winkler's procedural history; see also Landsman v. Moss, 579 N.Y.S.2d 450, 452 (App. Div.
1992); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 (1979).
89. MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 52 (stating that "after conviction (even for a lesser
offense than charged) or acquittal, the client will no longer be as interested in the legal services
nor will he be in a better position to pay a fee").
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acquittal, since there is no way to measure the worth of thirty-percent
of an acquittal. Nor is there any way to measure what a percentage is
of a lesser sentence or a conviction of a lesser charge. Of course, one
could always play actuary and examine life expectancy and future
income possibilities, as well as factor into account the potential
stigmatization of becoming "an accused," to come up with a monetary
figure. However, the bottom line remains that in criminal cases there
is no precise formula that can be used to determine an actual monetary
amount.
Additionally, the question arises as to the purpose of the
contingency. The ordinary criminal defendant seeking legal assistance
wishes to be acquitted of all criminal charges.9" Practically speaking,
instead of obtaining an acquittal, this accused individual may be
convicted, but with a lesser sentence of a lesser charge.9' The criminal
defense attorney who represents such a client and is able to persuade
the judge or jury that the defendant should be entitled to a lesser
punishment, or is able to broker a favorable plea, is one who has been
successful when all of the facts tend to demonstrate their client's
guilt.92  However, seeing as this may not have been the result for
which the client retained the attorney's services, the client may not
view it as a success, and not wish to pay the fee.93
If a client has agreed to pay a set amount, are they entitled to a
rebate if a worse outcome occurs than was originally anticipated?94
90. See Lushing, supra note 30, at 525.
91. See Christen R. Blair, Constitutional Limitations on the Lesser Included Offense Doctrine,
21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 445, 473-75 (1984) (providing a look at whether a criminal defendant is
allowed to receive a lesser penalty than what the prosecutor seeks).
92. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Legal Ethics: Innovative Legal Billing, Alternatives to Billable
Hours and Ethical Hurdles, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETH. 221, 230 (1999) (stating, in relation to
when a contingency fee should be paid by a client, "[tihe term 'outcome' need not necessarily
mean 'a complete judicial victory' or 'a complete judicial loss').
93. See, e.g., Kaushiva v. Hutter, 454 A.2d 1373 (D.C. 1983) (illustrating a scenario in
which a client refused to pay a fifteen percent contingency fee plan after the attorney had
substantially performed his share of services, when the case was near victory through arbitration,
and the client had made special demands on the attorney that could not be achieved).
94. In 1999, the Supreme Court of Georgia found that a partial rebate for a criminal
defense fee was valid. The defense attorney agreed to refund $15,000 of his $25,000 up front fee
if the charges against the defendant were dropped, and hence, there would be no trial. Although
this instance does not concern a contingency fee arrangement in a criminal context, it provides an
insight that rebates may be permissible in criminal cases, thus leaving the door open to rebates of
contingency fees charged by the criminal defense counsel. See June D. Bell, Justices Ok Fee-
Rebate Deal in Criminal Case, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT, Mar. 26, 1999, LEXIS, News
Library, FULTON File. This query is also analogous to one pondered before the Florida Bar
Association:
May an attorney contract with his client, in a criminal case, that the fee will be a
certain amount, to be paid in advance, providing, however, that in the event of a
guilty verdict, or, in the event of sentence being imposed whereby the defendant
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This is just another point that the attorney should disclose to the
client if initiating such a fee plan. To prevent potential problems, an
attorney should set clear standards for their criminal defendant client
that detail exactly what must be paid if a particular result occurs." In
civil trials, this seems easy, as the client knows whether they have won
or lost when the result indicates that they have acquired new property
or have lost property to their adversary. The criminal process is
different because there are various nuances that can lead to the
defendant evading punishment.96  Consequently, there are many
factors that must be evaluated before an attorney can make an
educated judgment as to what fee amount is appropriate.
B. The propriety of contingent fee plans in different criminal contexts.
The amount of the fee is not the only issue that must be
appropriate. What also must be appropriate is the situation in which a
contingency fee plan may be applied.97 Although a contingent fee plan
generally may be negatively regarded for all types of criminal cases,
there may be particular criminal matters whereby representation
should clearly not be based upon such a plan. The two cases
discussed earlier dealt with individuals who were to receive the
proceeds of the life insurance policies of the victims they were accused
of murdering.9 If the defendants were acquitted and it turned out
that the defendants did in fact murder the victims in an effort to attain
these funds, the attorney's paycheck would be the direct result of such
criminal acts. This is fully contrary to the principle that it is not
proper for an attorney to be paid from improperly acquired money.99
spends time in a jail or prison, the attorney will refund a given amount of the fee
previously paid? It is improper for an attorney representing a criminal defendant to
enter into an arrangement for a contingent fee.
Fla. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics , Op. 70-12 (July 6, 1970), available at
http://www.flabar.org/tfb/tfbetopin.nsf/SearchView/ETHICS,+OPINION+70-
12?opendocument (last visited Mar. 3, 2004).
95. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (1983) (stating "[a]
contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be
determined ... ").
96. See, e.g., Winkler, 523 N.E.2d 485, 486 (N.Y. 1988) (describing the actual contract the
attorney drafted with the defendant, which stated: "It is understood and agreed, subject to the
approval of [the defendant], that in the event [the defendant] is acquitted or found not guilty by
reason of insanity, or some other legal reason. .. shall pay, as additional legal fees, the sum
of .. .
97. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 35-53 (describing the legal contexts in which a
contingency fee plan is proper).
98. See Labonville, 492 A.2d 1376, and Winkler, 523 N.E.2d 485.
99. See In re Seifer, 628 N.Y.S.2d 945 (App. Div. 1995) (disbarring an attorney for
commingling client funds and otherwise obtaining funds through various illegal means).
Seattle University Law Review
The same seems true for cases involving a defendant accused of fraud,
in which there exists the possibility that if the attorney is successful,
his or her fee will come from property the client has obtained through
his or her wrongdoing.
Besides cases involving monetary disputes, perhaps defendants
charged with serious and egregious crimes contrary to core principles
of society should not be afforded the right to employ counsel with a
contingency fee arrangement. There is a much more tenable argument
to be made that certain types of crimes should not bear any association
to contingency fee arrangements due to social policy, rather than
claiming that social policy stands for the proposition that contingency
fee plans have no place in all criminal matters.' There is a difference
between white-collar crimes and crimes involving serious moral
turpitude.'' The punishments are different, as well as how each one
is regarded by society. 2 Furthermore, there is a greater social interest
in protecting the public from murderers0 3 and rapists than there is in
punishing an individual who has committed a sole act of
misrepresentation or marijuana possession. There is also a difference
between crimes in which conviction leads to time in prison, as
compared to charges and convictions not involving incarceration.
With the safety of society more at stake in the former categories than
in the latter ones, there may be more justification for reasons resting
on a basic policy rationale.
100. Rather than simply quoting professional rules of ethical conduct, as did occur in
United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), before the court made any
determination as to whether the arrangement between counsel and client was a contingent fee, it
may be better if a more objective view to such a fee plan is taken. More bite for the case against
contingent fees in criminal cases would be present if courts could articulate reasons why a
contingency fee plan should not be employed in certain cases. The Ianniello court simply stated
(in a footnote), "[clontingent fees for defense attorneys in a criminal action are void as against
public policy. 'In criminal cases, the rule is stricter because of the danger of corrupting justice."'
Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. at 457.
101. Annotation, What Constitutes "Crime Involving Moral Turpitude" Within Meaning of
§§ 212(a)(9) and 241 (a)(4) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 USCS §§ 1182(a)(9), 1251 (a)(4)),
and Similar Predecessor Statutes Providing for Exclusion or Deportation of Aliens Convicted of Such
Crime, 23 A.L.R. FED. 480 (1975) (distinguishing crimes of moral turpitude from other crimes
in that crimes involving moral turpitude are those that involve a serious delinquency that is
measured by community standards, which grievously offend the moral code of mankind).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., People v. Graham, 396 N.Y.S.2d 966, 974 (Sullivan County Ct. 1977)
(finding the interest of the State of New York to be significant where the defendant is charged
with murder, and other serious offenses).
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VII. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Ethical problems concerning the use of contingency fees in
criminal cases can be alleviated by different techniques. °4 The best
solution for all of these problems seems to be to enact regulations.
Whether a contingent fee may be applicable in a particular case and
how great it may be can be addressed and controlled by statutes. 10 5
Originally, contingent fees in civil cases were not thought of as
legitimate,106 but today these views have changed, with one reason
being that clients are protected from abuse through the safeguards of
statutes. °7 The implementation of uniform criminal defense practice
standards that attorneys can abide by in order to set rates is important,
104. See Lester Brickman, Contingency Fee Abuses, Ethical Mandates, and the Disciplinary
System: The Case Against Case-by-Case Enforcement, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339, 1349
(1996) (advocating methods to deal with contingency fee abuses by attorneys, including (1)
setting limits on the amount of fees an attorney may charge; (2) using the judiciary to scrutinize
the charging of fees on a sui generis basis; and (3) requiring an attorney to clearly provide all
information to the client so the client can make an educated decision as to whether or not a
contingent fee arrangement is appropriate in the given situation).
105. See Lushing, supra note 30, at 534 (stating that if things get out of hand, maximum
contingent fee rates or some other set of guidelines could be created and enforced to regulate, just
like what is presently done in civil cases); see, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2678
(2000) (restricting fees in such cases to twenty-five percent of the total judgment, and twenty
percent of a settlement); City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 567 (1992) (holding that the
enhancement of a contingency fee for services pertaining to the Solid Waste Disposal Act and the
Clean Water Act is not permitted).
106. See, e.g., Baca v. Padilla, 190 P. 730, 731 (N.M. 1920) (stating "[clontracts for
contingent fees by attorneys at law were not tolerated at all at common law"); Longmire v. Hall,
541 P.2d 276, 278 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975) (stating, in an action to recover attorney fees from a
divorce action, that "contracts for contingent fees paid attorneys were not tolerated at all at
common law"); Mazureau & Hennen v. Morgan, 25 La. Ann. 281, 281 (La. 1873) (finding that a
contingent contract between an attorney and a client is unlawful and quoting an old 1908
Louisiana Statute, which states, "that any bargain or agreement with a plaintiff or defendant on
the event of any suit to receive any portion of the land or any other property that may be in
dispute or sued for, as the compensation for the services of any attorney or counselor-at-law,
shall be null and void to all intents and purposes"); Roller v. Murray, 72 S.E. 665, 667-68 (Va.
1911) (finding a contingency fee contract between a lawyer and a client as "champertous" and
against public policy).
107. See, e.g., N.Y. ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS LAW § 474-a (2) (McKinney 2003)
(providing a statutory example of where contingent fee arrangements are limited by the
legislature). The statute reads,
Notwithstanding any inconsistent judicial rule, a contingent fee in a medical, dental or
podiatric malpractice action shall not exceed the amount of compensation provided for
in the following schedule:
30 percent of the first $250,000 of the sum recovered;
25 percent of the next $250,000 of the sum recovered;
20 percent of the next $500,000 of the sum recovered;
15 percent of the next $250,000 of the sum recovered;
10 percent of any amount over $1,2 50,000 of the sum recovered.
Id.; see also Yolango v. Popp, 644 N.E.2d 1318, 1322 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (discussing the §
474-a(2) fee schedule).
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otherwise attorneys will have the opportunity to charge a specified
percentage, and tell their clients that it is the amount that must be
paid if successful." 8
Additionally, courts and certain administrative bodies do have
the power to discipline attorneys for abuses of a criminal defense
contingency plan."9 Courts also have the inherent power to oversee
the collection of attorney fees and the collection of fee agreements.110
The interest of justice requires courts to award attorney fees that are
reasonable under the circumstances.'
VIII. CONCLUSION
As one can see, the general contemporary view should not be
conclusive on the issue of the ethical validity of the contingent fee in
criminal defense. There are many concerns associated with the use of
such contingency plans in the world of criminal justice, but these
concerns are no worse than those associated with other branches of
undeveloped law. The general view that it is unethical remains, yet
there is a shortage of reason and enforcement to prohibit attorneys and
clients from taking part in such a plan. Because such fee arrangements
are not inherently unethical, and views pertaining to similar matters
have changed with the times, it is foreseeable that there may be a
contingent of contingent fee arrangements in the criminal justice
world to come.
108. See Lushing, supra note 30, at 534.
109. See, e.g., In re Fasig, 444 N.E.2d 849 (Ind. 1983); In re Steere, 536 P.2d 54 (Kan.
1975) (reprimanding attorneys for entering into contingency fee arrangements in criminal cases).
110. See Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 674 (1999) (employing a twelve
factor test that a court can use to determine whether the actual fee the attorney charged should be
awarded. The twelve factors are (1) the amount of time and labor which is required; (2) the
novelty, uniqueness, and difficulty of the legal questions presented; (3) the skill needed to
perform adequate legal representation; (4) the amount of work that the attorney has foregone as a
result of taking the case; (5) the typical fee for such services; (6) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent; (7) whether there had been any time limitations that were imposed on the attorney by
the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved in the litigation and the resulting
judgment; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) whether the case is
desirable for the attorney to take; (11) the context of the relationship that the attorney has with
the client; and (12) the usual award that is achieved in similar cases.), rev'd on other grounds, 240
F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2001).
111. See Belzer v. Bollea, 571 N.Y.S.2d 365, 366 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (stating, "the whole point
and purpose of the rules fixing contingent fees in personal injury actions is to prevent attorneys
from exacting unconscionable fees even though there appears to be agreement by the client," in
an action in which the attorney settled a claim for the client before the case went to trial, and then
requested a substantially increased contingent percentage than was agreed to because of the
hardship that the case caused).
